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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002653

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/RA:BITTRICK
NSC FOR FRAZER AND MILLER, MCLEAN

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TAGS: [PREL](#), [MASS](#), [MARR](#), [CG](#), [BY](#), [NI](#)
SUBJECT: TFUS01: NIGERIA: DANJUMA'S CONDOLENCES, THE
MIL-MIL RELATIONSHIP AND AFRICA PKO OPERATIONS

REF: ABUJA 2562

(U) Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

11. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Jeter, accompanied by DATT, PolMilOff and DOD Colonel Terry Tidler called on Defense Minister Danjuma October 10 (COL I.D. Pennap, Personal Staff Officer to the Minister, also attended). Offering his condolences on September 11, Danjuma revealed that he had instructed the Chief of Army Staff to update contingency plans for Abuja. The MOD was noncommittal whether Nigeria would renew MPRI for 2002. He asked the DATT to discuss UNAMSIL rotation options with the Chief of Defense Staff. Nigeria continued to prepare for a Congo peacekeeping mission, and was preparing to support, but not lead, a Burundi mission. END SUMMARY.

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MPRI - WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE
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12. (U) During a discussion of the upcoming MPRI In-Progress-Review (which took place on October 12 - septel), Ambassador Jeter emphasized that MPRI was at a critical juncture. MPRI's reform assistance was clearly important to Nigeria's military institutions, but could only be effective if embraced by the MOD and Services. The Minister agreed, noting that he and the Service Chiefs would make their joint recommendation to the President based on the In-Progress-Review (IPR). He agreed to attend a Presidential meeting with Generals Saint and Vuono of MPRI, which we hope to have the week of October 22.

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OFR - GOOD NEWS
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13. (C) Ambassador Jeter remarked that Operation Focus Relief Phase 3 (OFR P3) was going exceptionally well. The Army was providing outstanding support to the DATT and the 3rd Special Forces Trainers. Clearly pleased, Danjuma declined a trip to one of the base camps for fear of helicopters, but agreed to visit the FOB in Abuja with the Ambassador soon. Raising the MOI, the Ambassador told Danjuma we still awaited the pending signature or a Nigerian response. The MOD Legal Department had, for some unknown reason, sent the document to the Nigerian Defense Intelligence Agency, Jeter explained. Danjuma, incredulous, could not understand why the Legal Department transmitted the MOI to DIA, but stated he would get an answer to us soon. Danjuma stated that he had already seen the 505 Note, and was confused why it had also not been completed. He directed Pennap to "chase it."

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UNAMSIL ROTATIONS
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14. (C) Ambassador Jeter informally asked Danjuma if Nigeria might consider a 6-month rotation for one of the units now entering UNAMSIL, with the goal of getting the third OFR P3 battalion into Sierra Leone by April. Danjuma, not willing to supercede planning by the Services, suggested the DATT raise the question with the Chief of Defense Staff.

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THE WORD ON DROC/BURUNDI
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15. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's question about peacekeeping commitments, Danjuma explained that Nigeria was committed to send troops to Congo and had designated a unit. However, delays in reaching a settlement in the DROC had caused them to stand down. Having served in the Congo in the 1960's, President Obasanjo felt a strong connection and was committed to participate when a mission began.

16. (C) On Burundi, Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana and one other country (Danjuma could not remember which), had begun discussions on a possible peacekeeping mission. The planning meetings, which Danjuma expected to conclude soon, would determine the size of the contingents, and dates of possible deployment. Deployment might begin in the near future, but Nigeria would be last to deploy in any rotation. Troops from Southern African countries should lead since Nigeria was not sufficiently familiar with the area, Danjuma reasoned.

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TERRORISM
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17. (C) The meeting concluded with a brief discussion on terrorism. Danjuma said that unfortunately globalization and information technology had afforded the terrorists as much propaganda capacity as the West. He also expressed concern that the Al-Qa'ida and associated organizations would stop at nothing to drag ordinary Nigerians into the conflict. Ambassador Jeter contended that Nigeria's greatest vulnerability was its oil and natural gas facilities in the Delta. Actually, said Danjuma, "We worry about Abuja." Explaining that Abuja had an open and excellent road system, which was essentially "deserted" at night, Danjuma had tasked Chief of Army Staff LTG Ogomudia to update Army contingency plans for the capital.

18. (C) COMMENT: Recently back from a long vacation in Spain, Danjuma appeared refreshed. This boded well for the MPRI/IPR, but even after good, open and frank discussions, it remains unclear whether the Ministry and Services will support another round of the program. While Danjuma's mentioning of Abuja as the greatest security concern in the aftermath of September 11 seems out of step with mainstream senior GON thinking, we are nonetheless heartened that he is taking precautions to guard the city and, by extension, the Embassy. END COMMENT.

19. (C) Freetown minimize considered.
Jeter